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ABSTRACT This article explores substantive justice and mediation from the
philosopher John Rawls' concept of the original position. Whether mediators
do or should care about substantive justice is a question that continues to
bedevil the field, theorists, and practitioners alike. In some parts of the
world, opinion leaders and influential trade organizations have weighed in,
promulgating ethics codes that, in large part, divest mediators of concern
with the substantive justice of the agreements they facilitate. While
consideration of a mediator's proper relationship to justice usually revolves
around Kantian concerns for disputant autonomy, little attention has been
paid to the role of more modern deontologists like John Rawls. This paper
argues that as mediation becomes a fixture in a world of ever-increasing
inequality, Rawls' central message gains resonance. Rawls' theory ofjustice
held that society should strive toward equality of opportunity and that, where
inequality exists, societal rules should be formulated to advantage the least
resourced among us. In our view, mediation's ethical codes should be
structured to protect the least advantaged ofmediation's participants.
In an effort to bring Rawls into the dialogue on mediation ethics, this
essay places the mediation participant in the original position and asks how
he or she might approach issues of substantive justice in a mediation
process. It surveys, briefly, a number of ethics codes drawn from different
regions in the world and notes that different jurisdictions have struck
different balances regarding the mediator's relationship to justice. We ask,
what would a code drafted by mediation enthusiasts operating under the
"veil of ignorance" look like? And, given mediation's use in dispute
contexts characterized by unequal distributions of power, why doesn't
Rawls' theory ofjustice hold more sway?
1. INTRODUCTION
II. MEDIATION'S REACH AND GROWING INEQUALITY
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III. MEDIATION'S PROGRESSIVE OR REGRESSIVE RELATIONSHIP TO JUSTICE:
THE DEBATES
IV. CODES FROM AROUND THE WORLD-DOES SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS
MATTER?
A. The Definition ofMediation
B. The Role ofMediators
C. Procedural and Substantive Justice
V. A RAWLSIAN APPROACH TO MEDIATION ETHICS
A. How can a mediator assess substantive justice when justice has no
enduring content and represents mere subjective preferences?
B. How can a mediator assess substantive justice when they lack the
necessary expertise to do so?
C. How can a mediator, bound by the profession's codes and best
practices to be impartial, have any obligations for outcome fairness?
D. Ifyour Rawlsian mediator is not telling the parties what is fair and
what to do, how does your mediator differ from standard conceptions
of the mediator role that task the mediator with responsibility for
process fairness alone?
VI. APPLICATION: AN ACTUAL CASE FOR THE RAWLSIAN MEDIATOR
VII. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
In his runaway bestseller, The World is Flat, New York Times
columnist, Thomas Friedman, described a global landscape leveled and knit
together by lightning fast fiber-optics, open source software and global
supply chains.' Citing the growing trends of uploading, outsourcing, and
off-shoring, Friedman describes a world where information, ideas, money,
I THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (1st ed. 2005).
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and opportunity travel freely, unimpeded by political or geographic barriers.2
Friedman's flat world, however, was not recognizable to some
commentators, who witness, instead, a more vertiginous economic
topography: a "spiky" world where, "the tallest peaks-the cities and regions
that drive the world economy-are growing ever higher, while the valleys
mostly languish."3 An interesting analogy could be drawn to mediation's
broad march across the globe and the implications of that march on questions
of social justice.'
Mediation continues to be a growth industry, both in developing nations
and developed economies. As an alternative to traditional adversary forms,
mediation has established a beachhead in virtually every region around the
globe. Movement into previously uncharted subject matter areas parallels
this geographic expansion. Parties who, in earlier times, would most
certainly have pled their case before a judge, find themselves embarked
instead on facilitated negotiations.
That this growth is taking place in a period that some have dubbed "the
New Gilded Age"5 requires a reexamination of mediation's ethical canon.
This canon has been shaped in large part by two aspects of the field's
identity: (1) the conviction that procedures structured to maximize
autonomous decision-making will yield maximally fair outcomes and (2)
postmodern skepticism regarding the existence of universal public values and
objective, verifiable "truths." These two intellectual and moral commitments
have led to a set of ethical mandates centered almost entirely on party self-
determination and a conception of justice that is almost entirely procedural
rather than substantive.
The question of substantive justice and whether a mediator can or should
be held accountable for the fairness of the mediated outcome remains hotly
debated and unsettled.6 This lack of consensus is apparent both from a
2 Id at 51-199.
Richard Florida, The World is Spiky, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2005, at 48, 48.
4 Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks
and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 3 (2012) (defining social justice to
mean "a state of affairs in which inequalities of wealth, power, access, and privilege-
inequalities that affect not merely individuals but entire classes of people-are eliminated
or greatly decreased.").
'See David B. Grusky & Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Poverty and Inequality in a New
World, Introduction to THE NEw GILDED AGE: THE CRITICAL INEQUALITY DEBATES OF
OUR TIME I (David B. Grusky & Tamar Kricheli-Katz, eds. 2012).
6 See Omer Shapira, Conceptions & Perceptions of Fairness in Mediation, 54 S.
TEX. L. REV. 281, 284-90 (2012) (describing a myriad of sometimes conflicting
conceptions of fairness in mediation literature); Elad Finkelstein & Shahar Lifshitz,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Mediator: A Communitarian Theory of Post-Mediation
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review of the academic literature as well as a sampling of authoritative
ethical codes and standards. The codes we review universally require
mediators attend to party self-determination and mediator impartiality, but
split in their assessment as to whether mediators have any responsibility for
the substantive fairness of the agreements they help create. We contend that
mediators should attend to the substantive fairness of the agreements they
foster and use John Rawls' theory of justice for support. We apply Rawls'
concept of the "original position" to the formulation of ethical codes for
mediators, and conclude that Rawls' arguments imply enhanced
accountability for outcome fairness, operationalized in ways that do not
unduly trench on other important mediation values.
Our argument proceeds in four parts: In part two, we set mediation's
increasing global expansion within the context of rising income and wealth
inequality; part three reviews the rich and contentious literature surrounding
mediation's relationship with substantive justice and mediator accountability
for outcome fairness; and part four discusses five ethics codes from
mediation-friendly regions throughout the world and examines their
divergent treatment of mediator role and accountability for substantive
fairness. Our last part asks what ethical responsibilities would a mediation
participant cloaked in Rawls' "veil of ignorance" ascribe to her mediator? If,
according to Rawls, societal structures should be organized in ways that
benefit the least advantaged, how might that insight be translated to the
formulation of ethical mandates in mediation? We conclude by suggesting
that an exclusive focus on party self-determination, while institutionally
pragmatic, provides too little in the way of party protection and offers too
little ethical ballast in a world of pervasive extra-legal disputing and
profound inequality.
II. MEDIATION'S REACH AND GROWING INEQUALITY
As an institutionalized alternative to costly and cumbersome judicial
procedures, mediation has enjoyed considerable popularity in the United
States, England, Canada, and Australia for several decades. In each of these
countries, mediation receives support from courts at all levels seeking to
reduce backlog, streamline dockets, and improve efficiency.7 Mediation
Contracts, 25 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 667 (2010) (arguing for enhanced regulation
to ensure the fairness of post-mediation contracts).
7 See NADJA ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MEDIATION: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 53, 55 (1s' ed. 2009); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Reshaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN
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practice in Europe received a boost from the EU Parliament's 2008 passage
of the Mediation Directive, which encouraged member states to use
commercial mediation for cross-border disputes and had the subsidiary effect
of catalyzing member nations' domestic programs. 8 In response to the
directive, Ireland's Law Reform Commission proposed new mediation-
enabling legislation.' Italy adopted a mandatory mediation requirement for
litigants in a diverse array of suits."o
ST. L. REV. 165 (2003) (an overview of alternative dispute resolution in the United
States); Joel Richler, Court-Based Mediation in Canada, 50 JUDGES' J. 14 (2011) (an
overview of the Canadian alternative dispute resolution system); NEIL ANDREWS, THE
THREE PATHS OF JUSTICE: COURT PROCEEDINGS, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN
ENGLAND 187, 193-94 (2012) (noting the increasing use of mediation in England);
AUSTRALIAN Gov'T ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEP'T, A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2009),
https://www.ag.gov.aulLegalSystem/Documents
/A%20Strategic%2OFramework%20for/o2OAccess%20to%2OJustice%20in%20the%20F
ederal%20Civil%2OJustice%20System.pdf; Lucille M. Ponte, Reassessing the Australian
Adversarial System: An Overview of Issues in Court Reform and Federal ADR Practice
in the Land Down Under, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 335 (2008) (an overview of
the reforms made to the Australian justice system and their incorporation of alternative
dispute resolution).; CENTRE FOR EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE SIXTH
MEDIATION AUDIT (2014), http://www.cedr.com/docslib/TheMediatorAudit2014.pdf (a
survey of civil and commercial mediators indicates that mediation increased 9% from
previous audit in 2012).
8 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe Headed Down the Primrose Path With
Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 981, 989 (2012) (an overview
of the EU's Mediation directive).
' Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mediation and Conciliation, LAW REFORM
COMMISSION (Nov. 2010), http://www.lawreform.ie/ fileupload/reports/r98adr.pdf.
"o See Francesca De Paolis, Italy Implements Mandatory Pre-Trial Mediation in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 65 DisP. RESOL. J. 16 (2010). It should be noted that
Italy's mandatory mediation law has traversed a rocky road toward implementation. In
December 2012, Italy's Constitutional Court suspended this law declaring it an
unconstitutional denial of access to justice. See Sonya Leydecker, Alexander Oddy &
Anita Phillips, Italy's Constitutional Court Rules Mandatory Meditation
Unconstitutional, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 5 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g-855928ac-b9Oe-45ff-b764-adlb75c3836a. The law was substantially
rewritten and re-enacted and now contains an opt-out provision whereby attorneys and
their clients can withdraw from mediation at an early stage. Incentives were included,
however, to encourage parties to continue in the process. Where a party is considering
withdrawal, the mediator may propose a solution to the dispute. If it is rejected and the
case goes to trial, the judge may shift onto the rejecting party all mediation and litigation
costs, if the judgment is consistent with the mediator's proposal. See Martin Svatos,
Mandatory Mediation Strikes Back, MEDIATE (Nov. 2013),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/SvatosMI.cfm.
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Other EU members eschewed the controversies associated with requiring
disputant participation, but instead dangled financial incentives before
uncertain litigants. In both Bulgaria and Romania, parties who resolve their
dispute in mediation can expect a partial or complete refund of their filing
fees."
The push to increase mediation's use extends beyond first-world borders.
As others have noted, Western-style mediation has become a near ubiquitous
cultural export.1 2 Initiatives funded by Agencies such as USAID (United
States Agency for International Development), AUSAID (Australian Agency
for International Development), the World Bank, and the American Bar
Association, have sought to plant the mediation seed in such far-flung soil as,
Thailand, Tonga, Albania, Bahrain, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and
Malaysia.' 3 Whether these seeds are taking root in the manner intended
remains questionable,' 4 but the expansionist impulse continues."
" See Ekaterina Dimcheva, Mediator Country Report: Bulgaria, JAMS INT'L ADR
CTR. http://www.adrcenter.com/jamsinternational/civil-justice/Mediation Country
Report Bulgaria.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (discussing reimbursement of court fees
at Art. 78, paragraph 9 of the Civil Procedure Code); Constantin Adi Gavrila, Breaking
Down the Romanian Mediation Law, JAMS ADR BLOG (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://jamsadrblog.com/2012/04/26/breaking-down-the-romanian-mediation-law/.
12 See Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics,
Power, and Practice in Nepal, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 295 (2006) (discussing how
U.S.-led aid programs, particularly those aiming to establish or reestablish the rule of law
in developing or transitional states, employ mediation as a foundational element).
" CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, THAI GOOD GOVERNANCE PROGRAM:
MEDIATION TRAINING AND TRAIN THE TRAINERS, BANGKOK (2000),
http://archives.cap.anu.edu.au/cdi anu edu au/CDlwebsite_1998-
2004/thailand/thailand downloads/ThaiMediationReport.pdf. See AuSAID, AUSTRALIAN
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ANNUAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT
2008-2009 (2009) (in Tonga, the Pacific Governance Support Program, Tonga was also
funded by AusAID to provide alternative dispute resolution training). See also Press
Release, USAID, Usaid Supports Court Mediation in Albania (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-supports-court-mediation-
albania (USAID-funded initiatives assist development of mediation in Albania); WORLD
BANK GROUP, MEDIATION HELPS RESOLVE BuSINESs DISPUTES IN PAPUA NEw GUINEA
(2012), https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/regulatory-
simplification/debt-resolution-and-business-exit/upload/Mediation-Helps-Resolve-
Business-Disputes-in-Papua-New-Guinea.pdf.
" See Fatahillah A. Syukar & Dale M. Bagshaw, Court-Annexed Mediation in
Indonesia: Does Culture Matter?, 30 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 369, 369 (2013).
" See Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande, "From the Trenches to the Towers"
Current Illusions and Delusions About Conflict Management-In Africa and Elsewhere,
27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 573, 591 (2002).
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Mediation's migration into new geographic regions has been
accompanied by a shift into new subject matter terrain. Once primarily a
creature of industrial trade or community relations, mediation is now an
institutionally encouraged 16 procedural step in both civil and criminal
contexts. 17 The use of mediation in patent infringement, human rights
violations, housing foreclosure, attorney discipline, and end of life decision-
making underscores the process's incursion into species of conflict that
would earlier have been reserved for more formal modes of dispute
processing.'" If, in the 1960s and '70s, mediation was confined to collective
bargaining negotiations,1 9 neighbor-neighbor disputes, 20 and the rare "hippie"
divorce; 21 today, it is equally likely that the process will be invoked in
"See Nolan-Haley, supra note 8, at 999-1009 (in some jurisdictions, mediation is
not voluntary but rather mandated by judicial authority).
17 See Maureen E. Laflin, Criminal Mediation Has Taken Root in Idaho's Court, 56
ADVOCATE 37, 37 (2013); Gabriel H. Teninbaum, Easing the Burden: Mediating
Misdemeanour Criminal Matters, 62 DisP. RESOL. J. 63, 66 (2007) (discussing
demonstrated success of Washington D.C. misdemeanour mediation program). See also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 14152 (West 2011) (allows the District Attorney to refer
misdemeanour cases to community conflict resolution programs). See also AUSTRALIAN
GOV'T ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEP'T, supra note 7; Robert Hulls, ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S
JUSTICE STATEMENT 2 (2008).
" See WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Update on the WIPO Arbitration
and Mediation Center's Experience in the Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes,
44 LES NOUVELLES 49 (2009). See generally Heather S. Kulp & Jennifer Shack, A
(Mortgage) Crisis in Communication: Foreclosure Dispute Resolution as Effective
Response?, 66 ARK. L. REV. 185 (2013) (discussing the effectiveness of foreclosure ADR
programs in Connecticut, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and other states); Mary Patricia
Benz, The Mediation Option for Attorney Discipline Cases: Are Some Disciplinary Cases
Good Candidates For Mediation? This Lawyer-Mediator Says "Yes ", 98 ILL. Bus. J. 262
(2010) (discussing the use of mediation programs to facilitate resolutions to attorney
discipline cases leading to better outcomes and a more positive perception from the
public); Glenn Cohen, Negotiating in the Shadow of Death, 11 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 12
(2004) (discussing ADR's capacity to resolve conflicts surrounding end-of-life decisions
quickly and more effectively than traditional litigation).
1 9 See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE I (2d ed. 2006)
(discussing development following World War II of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, whose mandate is to provide mediation services to private sector
union and management personnel engaged in collective bargaining).
20 See generally THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF
COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sally E. Merry & Neil Milner eds.,
Univ. Mich. Press 1993).
2 1 See generally O.J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT:
A HANDBOOK FOR MARITAL MEDIATORS (1978) (divorce mediation was still an
experimental innovation in the late 1970s when therapist O.J. Coogler began working
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violent domestic disputes in Indonesia,22 eve-of-foreclosure talks between
struggling mortgagees and banks in Ireland, 23 and injured medical
malpractice victims seeking redress in Malaysia.24
Mediation's global ubiquity must be assessed in the context of growing
inequality between the haves and the have-nots. Discussion of the decline of
the middle class and the rise of modem-day plutocrats has moved beyond the
lecture halls of academic economists and into mainstream news outlets and
political stump speeches. We live in a modem-day Gilded Age.2 5 In the
United States, income gains and wealth accumulation at the top and bottom
segments of the socioeconomic pyramid are diverging at rates not seen since
the 1920s. 2 6 Between 1979 and 2007, the incomes of the top 1% of the
population grew by 275% while the incomes of the middle class rose less
than 40%.27 Comparative assessments of wealth are even starker. The top
20% of American households garners 87.2% of the nation's wealth, while the
bottom 40% of households is effectively unable to accumulate wealth at all. 2 8
Studies of social mobility reveal that life horizons are profoundly shaped by
with separating couples who wished to bypass the hostilities occasioned by the adversary
system).
2 2 See Tackling Domestic Violence in Indonesia's Papua Province, IRIN (Dec. 13,
2013), http://www.irinnews.org/report/99331/tackling-domestic-violence-in-indonesia-s-
papua-province (discussing the prevalence of domestic violence in this region and
identifying various processes, including mediation, used to resolve such disputes).
23 See Mark Paul, AIB Agrees 120 Mortgage Deals, Including Write-Down, IRISH
TIMES (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/business/financial-services/aib-agrees-
120-mortgage-deals-including-write-down-1.1676937 (discussing pilot mediation
program in Ireland that settled roughly 120 bank-mortgagee disputes. According to the
report "[a]bout 26 of the deals involved the property being sold or surrendered. About
half of those involved got the remaining debt completely written off. The rest involved
monthly payments on the residual debt, following sale, for up to seven years.").
2 4 See Tan Shiow Chin, Opting for Mediation, STAR ONLINE (Dec. 16, 2012),
http://www.thestar.com.my/story/?file=%2F2012%2Fl/2%2F 16%2Fhealth%2F 12288851
&sec=health (Medical Defense Malaysia, a medical defense organization as well as
Medico Legal Society of Malaysia are both encouraging medical malpractice plaintiffs to
take their cases to mediation instead of the courts).
25 See THE NEW GILDED AGE: THE CRITICAL INEQUALITY DEBATES OF OUR TIME
(David Grusky & Tamar Kricheli-Katz eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2012).
26 See THOMAS PiKETrY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 237-376 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
27 See ROB REICH & DEBRA SATZ, Ethics and Inequality, in OCCUPY THE FUTURE 47,
47 (David B. Grusky et al. eds., 2013).
28 See .David Grusky & Erin Cumberworth, Economic Inequality in the United
States: An Occupy-Inspired Primer, in OCCUPY THE FUTURE 13, 17 (David B. Grusky et
al. eds., 2013).
398
[Vol. 30:3 20161
MEDIATORS AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE
parental class, education, and income.29 Income inequality skews opportunity
and dampens intergenerational mobility.30 Moreover, education, a perceived
escape route from privation, is largely failing to transport those not already
born to some advantage. In 1984, the children of the top quintile of eamers
were 75% more likely to graduate from college than the bottom quintile. In
1993, that number stood at a stubborn 69.5%. As growth and the rewards
from labor slow, accumulated capital and inheritance play a greater role.
Movement up the socioeconomic ladder from one generation to the next is
slow and limited. The class into which we are born exerts a greater
gravitational pull than our rhetoric of equal opportunity would allow. 32
Inequality is increasing in most economies throughout the globe. The
Gini coefficient, a measurement tool developed by an Italian statistician in
the early twentieth century, measures trends toward equality or inequality of
income and wealth distribution, with 0 representing complete equality and I
representing complete inequality. 3 Between 1990 and 2010, the Gini
coefficient for disposable income increased in nearly all European
economies. Inequality also rose in most economies in Asia and the Pacific,
the Middle East, and North Africa. If one were to rank the world's nations
according to where they fall on the spectrum of inequality, South Africa and
Namibia would lead the pack with Gini coefficients of 60 and above. Brazil,
Bolivia, Colombia, and several other Latin American countries would come
"See Raj Chetty et al., Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent
Trends in Intergenerational Mobility, 104 AM. EcoN. REV. 141, 141-47 (2014). See also
Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Shadowy Lines that Still Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2015 ("Because income inequality is greater here, there is a wider disparity between what
rich and poor parents can invest in their children. . . . 'Being born in the elite in the U.S.
gives you a constellation of privileges that very few people in the world have'-ever
experienced .... Being born poor in the U.S. gives you disadvantages unlike in Western
Europe and Japan and Canada.'").
30 See Miles Corak, Income Inequality, 27 J. ECoN. PERSP. 79, 79-102 (2013).
3 PIKETTY, supra note 26, at 377-78 (arguing that "Whenever the rate of return on
capital is significantly and durably higher than the growth rate of the economy, it is all
but inevitable that inheritance (of fortunes accumulated in the past) predominates over
saving (wealth accumulated in the present) . . . . Almost inevitably, this tends to give
lasting disproportionate importance to inequalities created in the past, and therefore to
inheritance.").
32 See NORMAN DANIELS ET AL., IS INEQUALITY BAD FOR OUR HEALTH? (Joshua
Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How
TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012).
33 See BRANKO MILANOVIC, THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS: A BRIEF AND
IDIOSYNCRATIC HISTORY OF GLOBAL INEQUALITY 29-30 (2011).
34See IMF, Fiscal Policy andIncome Inequality, IMF Policy Paper (2014).
3 Id at 7.
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in a close second with Gini coefficients hovering around 56. China, India,
and a few select countries in Asia, such as Malaysia and Thailand, would
rank next with Gini coefficients estimated at 50-54, and the United States
and Russia would follow closely behind with coefficients of 49 and 42
respectively. 16 Given that economists perceive wealth dispersion in both
Russia and the United States to be at dangerously skewed levels, it is clear
that in many regions throughout the world, the problem of inequality is
creating a code-red situation.3 7
To date, mediation scholars have paid scant attention to whether
mediation's methods and goals should respond to this new economic reality.
A few vocal critics aside, the mediation community has largely viewed
inequality in the world as simply part of the substrate within which the
mediator works. Inequality is a fact to be accepted and managed, but not
challenged or remediated. In the words of one scholar-practitioner,
"[M]ediators do not encourage the lamb to stand up to the lion; rather the
imbalance created by the lion's strength and the lamb's vulnerability is part
of the setting within which the parties and the mediator negotiate." 8 In the
next section, we review these debates by examining the different definitions
of justice that mediation advocates and critics hold and how those definitions
lead to different conclusions regarding the scope and limits of the mediator's
role.
III. MEDIATION'S PROGRESSIVE OR REGRESSIVE RELATIONSHIP TO
JUSTICE: THE DEBATES
Almost from its very inception as a modern dispute resolution method,
critics have argued that mediation is antithetical to justice. The first wave of
mediation detractors were left-leaning social justice activists who viewed
36 See GORAN THERBORN, THE KILLING FIELDS OF INEQUALITY 115 (2013).
3 Id at 8 (noting correspondence between the rapid rise of the Gini coefficient in
Russia in the early 1990's and an increase in death rates and decrease in life
expectancy."). See also id. at 11-12 (noting that the affluent and well educated in East-
Central Europe, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland enjoy a longer life expectancy
rate than those limited to a primary education).
38 See Howard Bellman, Mediation as an Approach to Resolving Environmental
Disputes, Environmental Conflict Practitioners Workshop, Proceedings (1982))
(defending mediator neutrality on the grounds that after the mediation, the lion remains a
lion, the lamb remains a lamb, and the mediator's job is to "make the lion-lamb
relationship clear to the lamb.") (cited by Bush & Folger, supra note 4, at 31).
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informal justice as another form of state oppression. 3 9 These critics saw
mediation functioning as a negative force in three distinct ways: intrusion,
individuation, and diffusion. By insinuating itself into the formerly private
spaces of community and domestic life, mediation extended the reach of a
tyrannical state.4 0 By characterizing disputes as interpersonal scuffles, driven
by emotion and idiosyncratic tensions, mediation individuated conflict,
obfuscating its economic or political features. 4 1 And by tamping down the
flares of righteous discontent, mediation diffused and siphoned off the
39 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 136 (1983) ("[Clompromise only
is an equitable solution between equals; between unequals, it 'inevitably reproduces
inequality."'); Laura Nader, When is Popular Justice Popular, in THE POSSIBILITY OF
POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
435 (Sally E. Merry & Neil Milner eds., Univ. Mich. Press 1993) (arguing that "'popular
justice' movements are not usually popular, in the sense of being locally controlled or
bottom-up in origin, but rather movements that originate in centers of power and then try
to connect with local populations for purposes of control."); Richard L. Abel, The
Contradictions of Informal Justice, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOLUME 1:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 267, 270-80 (Richard L. Abel ed., Acad. Press 1982);
Christine B. Harrington, Voluntariness, Consent and Coercion in Adjudicating Minor
Disputes: The Neighborhood Justice Center, in POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: PENALTIES OR
INCENTIVES? 131 (John Brigham & Don W. Brown eds., Sage Publications 1980).
40See Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of
American Capitalism: A Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOLUME 1:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 207, 237 (Richard L. Abel ed., Acad. Press 1982). ("The
expansion of state power-the regulation of the totality of social existence-is
manifested in the subject matter deemed appropriate for resolution in NJC's
[(Neighborhood Justice Centers]). Because [NJCs] handle cases concerned not only with
violations of law but also with behavior identified as a social problem or a threat to
community stability, the range of control is greatly extended"); Christine B. Harrington,
Delegalization Reform Movements: A Historical Analysis, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE, VOLUME 1: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 35, 52 (Richard L. Abel ed., Acad.
Press 1982).
41 See Judy H. Rothschild, Dispute Transformation, The Influence of a
Communication Paradigm of Disputing, and the San Francisco Community Boards
Program, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at 265-66 (Sally E. Merry & Neil Milner eds., Univ.
Mich. Press 1993) (arguing that the San Francisco Community Boards adopted a
"communication paradigm of disputing" that leads to an emphasis on the . relational
aspect of conflicts and neglects the social, legal, and economic dimensions of disputes).
See also Harrington, supra note 39; Harrington, supra note 40, at 62 (describing
Neighborhood Justice Centers as part of a large decentralization movement that reduces
problems like "violence against women, neighborhood quarrels, and landlord tenant
problems" to "individual problems. The origins of these disputes are depoliticized or
ignored, and the resolutions . . . internalized by the individualized form of
participation.").
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reforming energy of consumers, workers, and other aggrieved groups.42 For
many of these early activists, the state was the enemy, the goal was to
reshape an oppressive capitalist order into softer socialist forms, and
community organizing and collective political action was the way forward.
Informal justice was viewed as a method for securing the quiescence of the
poor and marginalized and maintaining the power base of social and political
elites."
The second wave of mediation skeptics held very different assumptions.
Their critique emanates from a fundamentally more benevolent view of the
state and its potential to liberate, civilize and uplift.45 According to this
view, mediation's menace lies not in its capacity to bring the state's tentacles
into previously private spaces, but in its dampening effect on the
commonwealth's ability to articulate and enforce morally desirable public
norms. Owen Fiss, the most celebrated expositor of this view, descried the
ADR movement's focus on the satisfaction of private interests over the
elaboration and instantiation of public values.46 The task of the judge, Fiss
42See Christine B. Harrington, Community Organizing Through Conflict Resolution,
in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, 401, 429 (Sally E. Merry & Neil Milner, eds., Univ. Mich. Press
1993) (explaining that to the extent that the ethos of individualism replaces that of
empowering a community for the purpose of redistributive social change, neopopulist
movements like SFCB will break from "'authentic' or 'genuine' populism."); Abel,
supra note 39, at 267, 286 ("[Ajdvocates of informalism identify culture as the genesis of
significant social problems-not capitalism, class struggle, racisms, sexism, or autocratic
power.... [They] deny the existence of basic cleavages in American society and seek to
restore a consensus they locate in the silent fifties by exhorting grievants to moderate
their demands.").
43 See Hofricheter, supra note 40, at 267; Harrington, supra note 42, at 401; Nader,
supra note 39, at 435; Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law:
Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Reform Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 1 (1993).
" Abel, supra note 39, at 296.
" See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). See also
Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 668 (1986); Judith Resnick, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REv.
405 (1987); Judith Resnick, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211, 212 (1995).
46 See Fiss, supra note 45, at 1082, 1085 ("The dispute-resolution story trivializes
the remedial dimensions of lawsuits and mistakenly assumes judgment to be the end of
the process. It supposes that the judge's duty is to declare which neighbor is right and
which wrong . . . ." Fiss then explained, "[T]he purpose of adjudication . . . is not to
maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statues: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them.").
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asserted, was not simply to settle a private dispute, but to give force to
society's moral commitments as embodied in authoritative texts. School
desegregation cases might settle quietly and on terms that satisfy individual
litigants, but the resolution would not reaffirm the importance and necessity
of racial equality. Informal dispute mechanisms deprive courts and other
public bodies the opportunity to provide normative guidance on unsettled
social questions and invite parties to evade the legal principles that, in Fiss'
view, define a society and give it its identity and "inner coherence.""
Underlying the anxiety of Fiss and his fellow "litigation romantics" is
the conviction that something we can identify as substantive justice exists
and that it is embodied in the rule of law. 4 8 They maintain that substantive
justice is achieved when authoritative public bodies articulate and apply
norms predictably, consistently, and equally regardless of the race, creed,
color, or socioeconomic status of the litigants. 4 9 These romantics assumed
that legal norms worked in favor of social justice and they wanted those
norms in play when Americans came together to work out questions of who
is owed what from whom. Fiss and his fellow travelers pointed to the
reforms of the civil rights, labor, and feminist movements to demonstrate that
courtrooms had become friendlier venues for those on the bottom rungs of
47 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword to The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11, 14
(1979) ("The values embodied in such non-textually-specific prohibitions as the equal
protection and due process clauses are central to our constitutional order. They give our
society an identity and inner coherence-its distinctive public morality. . . .The task of a
judge, then, should be seen as giving meaning to our public values and adjudication as
the process through which that meaning is revealed or elaborated."). Fellow ADR
skeptic, Judge Edwards, pointed out in a related caution that in many cases-for example
the civil rights struggles in the South and other regions-local norms and customs-were
at odds with formal law's insistence on the cherished value of equal protection. See Harry
T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REv.
668, 679 (1986) ("One essential function of law is to reflect the public resolution of . . .
irreconcilable differences; lawmakers are forced to choose among these differing visions
of the public good. A potential danger of ADR is that disputants who seek only
understanding and reconciliation may treat as irrelevant the choices made by our
lawmakers and may, as a result, ignore public values reflected in rules of law.").
48 See discussion, supra note 47. See also Judith Maute, Public Values and Private
Justice: A Casefor Mediator Accountability, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991).
4 See Geoffrey C. Hazard & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private
Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 42 (1988) (private justice should embody
important characteristics of the public system of justice); David Luban, Settlement and
the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L. J. 2619, 2631 (1995) ("Fiss insists that the
unique genius of the courts is their twin requirements of independence and dialogue.
Independence guarantees an impartial use of reason, and dialogue guarantees that courts
must listen to all comers and reply with reasoned opinions.").
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American society. They did not want to see vulnerable disputants shunted
into forums where those recently earned legal endowments would not hold
sway.5o Power imbalances, which could be managed and contained in formal
legal proceedings, appeared particularly threatening in the freewheeling,
normative tabula rasa that mediation presents.
The mediation community has generated a number of responses to both
first wave and second wave attacks. The first wave "social control" critique
has itself been dismissed as highly theoretical and insufficiently grounded in
actual assessments of how mediation works. Professor Amy Cohen, in
examining claims that the export of Western style ADR necessarily results in
the "flourishing of hegemonic colonial forms," counters with descriptions of
mediation projects that are highly political and encourage collective action. 51
Similarly, legal sociologist, Patrick Stuart, drew from his study of housing
cooperatives to conclude that "communal justice within employee work
groups, neighborhood residence groups, mutual support, and self-help
groups, . . . are likely to do more to modify the shape of capitalist legality
than the collective justice of cooperatives, communes, and other more
socialistically oriented orders . . . .
The response to second wave attacks has taken several forms. Some
negotiation enthusiasts sided with Fiss with regard to "significant cases"
involving "deep moral disagreement," but maintained that more ordinary
so See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (discussing how cultural assumptions about women can present
disadvantages in mediation); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formalities:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
1359 (discussing how the informal nature of mediation and other forms of dispute
resolution may allow racial and ethnic prejudice to influence outcomes to the detriment
of minorities); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics
of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441 (1992) (discussing how mediation places men in a
dominant position in divorce mediation); Kathy Mack, Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Access to Justice for Women, 17 ADEL. L. REV. 123 (1995); Mary Anne Noone,
ADR, Public Interest and Access to Justice, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 57 (2011). See also
MARIA KARRAS ET AL., LAW AND JUSTICE FOUNDATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES, ON THE
EDGE OF JUSTICE: THE LEGAL NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN NSW
(2006); Frances Gibson, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Residential Tenancy Cases, 18
AUSTRL. DisP. RESOL. J. 101 (2007).
5 Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Globalization of US. Mediation: Politics, Power,
and Practice in Nepal, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 295 (2006) (discussing how U.S.-led
aid programs, particularly those aiming to establish or reestablish the rule of law in
developing or transitional states employ mediation as a foundational element).
. 52 Henry Stuart, Community Justice, Capitalists Society and Human Agency: The
Dialectics of Collective Law in THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER 101 (Richard L. Abel
ed., N.Y. Univ. Press 1995).
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cases could be disposed of in mediation.' Others agreed that litigation may,
but need not always, work to affirm public values, while asserting that
mediation can serve important norm-affirming functions as well.5 4  Still
others simply concede that mediation is a suboptimal process for securing
justice as embodied in legal rights and entitlements, but note that the process
has other virtues.s
The most radical response turns traditional understandings of justice on
its head by denying both the existence of universal values and their
embodiment in the rule of law. Although not explicitly or unanimously
declared, many mediation advocates are value skeptics, doubtful that
absolute moral verities exist. 56 They approach disputes not as contests
between right and wrong or more or less ethically correct viewpoints, but as
instances where party interests, narratives, or understandings have not been
sufficiently explored, fractionated, and aligned. 57 They tend to be moral
pluralists who survey the divergent moral commitments that animate
different cultures and conclude that what constitutes justice is both culturally
and temporally contingent.58 As Fisher, Ury, and Patton explained in their
best-selling book, Getting To Yes, truth is not a distinct ontological state but
rather "an argument-perhaps a good one, perhaps not-for dealing with ...
difference." 59
Mediators' skepticism extends to the relationship between legal norms
and substantive justice. For many mediation scholars, there is little
correlation between positive law and intuitions of justice. Joseph Stulberg, in
an article entitled Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, makes
" See Robert Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals
and Disputes 107 (2004) (noting that some cases should not settle, including cases in
which "a party has a strong desire to create a lasting legal precedent"); Frank E. A.
Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User Friendly Guide to
Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 60 (1994).
54 See J. R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881 (2004).
" Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, I J.
DisP. RESOL. 1 (2007).
56 See Dale Bagshaw, The Three M's-Mediation, Postmodernism and the New
Millennium, 18 MEDIATION Q. 205-20 (2001).
57 GERALD MONK & JOHN WINSLADE, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 31-56 (2000).
58 KEVIN AVRUCH, CONTEXT AND PRETEXT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION; CULTURE,
IDENTITY, POWER, AND PRACTICE (2012); Peter W. Black and Kevin Avruch, Cultural
Relativism, Conflict Resolution, Social Justice, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/pcs/
BlackAvruch6lPCS.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
59 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 22 (2d ed. 1991).
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the point that "simply because something is required by the 'law' or the
'organizational rule' does not mean 'justice' has been secured, even if a
judge applies those rules uniformly and consistently."6 o Moreover, "It is
possible that positive laws appear on their face to be fair but the manner in
which they are applied can generate morally perverse-and unjust-
outcomes."
Stulberg's perspective builds on two assumptions widely shared within
the mediation community. First, legal rules, far from embodying sacred
social ideals, are morally neutral road signs that simply organize the chaotic
traffic of human interaction. Second, generalized rules formulated by remote
authorities, even if sensible in the abstract, often do mischief when applied to
the particularized circumstances of distinct groups and individuals. 62 These
convictions are central to the field's willingness to shrug off legal norms as
almost irrelevant to the justice of a private disputing process.
Take, for example, the construct that Professors Lela Love and Jonathan
Hyman adopt in their poetically titled article, What if Portia Were a
Mediator?.6 3 In that piece, Love and Hyman posit that in an adjudicatory
system, we define justice as the impartial application of "properly created
standards or rules to 'facts' as determined by the adjudicator."' Justice
inheres in the source of the laws (democratically elected legislators and
properly appointed judges) and their neutral and consistent application.
Mediation, they write, works with a different definition of justice-"justice-
from-below."s This type ofjustice emanates from the parties themselves and
emerges from their good faith participation in the process.6 What is most
important is that "the mediated outcome rest easy with parties' values,
principles, and interests, addressing their needs-psychological, moral, and
practical-as they judge those needs to be."'
o Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 217 (2005).
61 Id See CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS; REGULATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
31 (1999) (arguing that the application of legal principles to a set of facts may not result
in substantive justice because the law itself is coercive and power may determine
outcomes).
62 See id at 215-18. See also Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things
Past: The Role of Past to Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 97 (2004).
63 Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into
Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 160-61 (2002).
64 Id. at 160.65 Id. at 162.
6 Id at 164.67 ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 137 (2011).
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As others have noted, 68 the mediation field takes seriously the
postmodern inquiry into the knowability of "objective" facts and values,
asking, "[i]s there really any there."69 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in
her article, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World,7 0 explicitly links postmodern explorations into the
provisional and layered nature of truth with alternative dispute resolution's
rejection of rigid binary thinking and openness to multiple stories,
perspectives, and possibilities." She connects the deconstruction of literary
texts with the recognition that partisan "authors" with interests of their own
construct judicial opinions.72 And, she weaves together postmodern anxieties
regarding the existence of a unitary interpretive self with mediation's choice
to bypass the central authority of the courts in favor of the parties'
autodidactic construction of remedial options.73 As Menkel-Meadow notes,
postmodernism throws up a basic challenge to traditional legal authorities
and methods in its insistence that we may lack the epistemological tools to
evaluate anything. In the wake of Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and their
assault on Enlightenment rationality, 74 mediation's turn away from
authoritative enunciations of justice in favor of multiple shifting iterations of
"what can work" seems both unsurprising and inevitable.
To sum up, then, if traditional understandings of justice involve the
application of universal public values to a readily verifiable fixed set of facts,
mediation theorists question the existence and reliability of both values and
facts. Retreating from any substantive conception of justice, theorists have
instead focused on pure process. Ethics in the mediation realm is thus largely
a matter of identifying the conditions most likely to give effect to party voice
and deliberation and restraining mediators from distorting the process with
their own substantive preferences. If those conditions and restraints are in
place, it is assumed the resulting outcome will be just.7 5
68 Amy J. Cohen & Michal Alberstein, Progressive Constitutionalism and
Alternative Movements in Law, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 1083 (2011).
69 With apologies to Gertrude Stein. See GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
7 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
71 Id at 6, 13.
72 Id at 2O-21.
74 Id
7 See Stulberg, supra note 60, at 222-23, 227-28 (arguing that mediators can "build
conditions or constraints into the conception of the mediation procedure that minimize"
injustice including voluntariness, inalienability of interests, publicity of outcomes,
dignity and respect, informed decision-making, and toleration of conflicting fundamental
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To borrow from John Rawls' vocabulary, the claim is that mediation
presents a system of "pure procedural justice," a system where no
independent criterion exists to ascertain the "right result" other than the
criterion that the proper process has been followed.7 6 It is only a few "justice
contrarians"-the authors included-who continue to object that in many
instances, social and legal norms serve as valuable external criterion by
which mediated outcomes can and should be assessed.77 In the next section,
we review five ethics codes from around the world and note the lack of
consensus on the relationship between mediation and questions of
substantive justice and the role of the mediator in ensuring outcome-fairness.
IV. CODES FROM AROUND THE WORLD-DOES SUBSTANTIVE
FAIRNESS MATTER?
Sidestepping the question of what a content-full notion of substantive
justice might require, mediation's ethics codes work mainly toward fulfilling
Rawls' criteria for pure procedural justice: the creation of a "scheme of
cooperation" such that any result emanating from that cooperation can be
said to be fair.78 In Rawls' schema, equality of opportunity is a central
condition for the creation of societal institutions that provide pure procedural
justice. For mediators, maximal party autonomy and the absence of untoward
mediator influence are essential conditions for a process that will produce
just outcomes. Following deontologist Immanuel Kant's dictum that
individuals should not be treated merely as means to other's ends, but as
values). Most mediation theorists agree with Professor Stulberg that-with certain
process safeguards-mediation is a system of "pure procedural justice"-a process
where importing external criterion to assess the substantive fairness of the outcomes
reached is not only unnecessary, but unwise. But see Lola Akin Ojelabi, Mediation and
Justice: An Australian Perspective Using Rawls' Categories of Procedural Justice, 31
CIv. JUST. Q. 318, 324-29 (2012) (arguing that mediation does not fit neatly into any of
Rawls' categories of procedural justice).
7 6 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971).
7 Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1997); See WALDMAN, supra note 67, at 124-30
(arguing that there are three approaches to consideration of norms in the mediation field:
the norm-generating, norm-advocating, and the norm educating models); Lola Akin
Ojelabi, Mediation and Justice: An Australian Perspective Using Rawls' Categories of
Procedural Justice, 31 Civ. JUST. Q. 318, 335-39 (2012) (arguing that there is a need for
objective standards by which to evaluate substantive justice in mediation, and that legal
norms may be useful in this regard).
78 RAWLS, supra note 76, at 88.
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ends unto themselves, 79 the bedrock ethical commandment for mediators is
to respect parties as the primary decision-makers, not as conduits of
information for other decision-makers. The ethics codes that we review
emphasize the mediator's duty to ensure procedural justice, while leaving the
question of outcome fairness and substantive justice very much in the
shadows.
A. The Definition ofMediation
Most codes of conduct define mediation as involving a third party who
facilitates a conversation between the parties in order to assist them in
reaching a settlement of issues in dispute between them. The Australian
National Mediator Accreditation Scheme (NMAS) practice standards define
mediation as a process in which the participants, with the support of a
mediator, identify issues, develop options, consider alternatives and make
decisions about the future actions and outcomes."o The purpose of mediation,
according to this code, is to maximize the participants' decision-making.81 It
is the parties' responsibility to resolve the dispute based on mutual terms.
The role of the mediator is to "support" the parties to make their own
decision. 82 The mediator assists the parties to identify issues, generate
options, consider alternative processes, and reach an agreement. 83 These
7 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Allen W.
Wood ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785) (cited in GORDON GRAHAM, EIGHT THEORIES
OF ETHICS, 115 (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2004)).
8o NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SyS. APPROVAL STANDARDS § 2; PRACTICE
STANDARDS § 2 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2012). The analyses in this paper are
based on the Australian Standards applicable until June 2015. A revised Standards came
into effect after July 1, 2015. Where relevant, this paper will identify differences between
the old and new standards and how that might change the argument presented. The
definition in the 2015 Standards is similar and promotes party self-determination. See
NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 2.2 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2015).
81 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 2.5 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012). Under the 2015 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs.
PRACTICE STANDARDS § 2.1, a mediator assists "participants to make their own decisions
82 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION Sys. APPROVAL STANDARDS § 2.1 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012).
83 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION Sys. APPROVAL STANDARDS § 2.2 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012); NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS
§ 2.4 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2012); NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS.
PRACTICE STANDARDS § 2.2 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015).
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Standards describe mediation as primarily facilitative-not advisory,
evaluative, or determinative.'
Similarly, the U.S. Model Standards for Mediators define mediation as
"a process in which an impartial third party facilitates communication and
negotiation and promotes voluntary decision-making by the parties to the
dispute."8 5 The Model Standards explicitly warn against undermining party
self-determination for reasons "such as higher settlement rates, egos,
increased fees, or outside pressures . . . . The International Mediation
Institute (IMI) Code of Professional Conduct defines mediation as "a process
where two or more parties appoint a third-party neutral ('Mediator') to help
them in a non-binding dialog to resolve a dispute and/or to conclude the
terms of an agreement." 87 As in the U.S. and Australian codes, the IMI
definition clarifies that the parties are engaged in a dialogue that, without
more, has no legal effect and that the mediator is in a secondary, supportive
role.
Mediation, according to the European Code of Conduct for Mediators,
"means any structured process, however named or referred to, whereby two
or more parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, on a voluntary basis, to
reach an agreement on the settlement of their dispute with the assistance of a
third person."" Once again, the definition makes clear that the mediator
enters the process to assist the parties who remain the primary actors and
decision-makers.8 9
The definition of mediation is not outlined in the Singapore Mediation
Code of Conduct. However, on its website, the goal of mediation is described
as finding "a practical solution and settlement that is acceptable to all
involved" and that the "[k]ey to mediation is that parties make their own
decisions, often with the help of their lawyers. They are in complete control
84 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs. APPROVAL STANDARDS § 2.3 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012). This particular description of mediation does not appear in the
revised 2015 Standards, but it stipulates that a "mediator does not evaluate or advise on
the merits of, or determine the outcomes of, disputes" except when using a "blended
process" with the parties' consent. NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE
STANDARDS §§ 2.2, 10.2 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015).
85 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Preamble (AM. BAR Ass'N
2005).
86 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard (1)(B) (AM. BAR
Ass'N 2005).
87 CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT Definitions (INT'L MEDIATION INST.).
https://imimediation.org/imi-code-of-professional-conduct) (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
88 EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Introductory Statement (EUR.
COMMISSION 2004).
89 Id.
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of the outcome and do not run the risk of having an unfavorable decision
imposed upon them by a judge or arbitrator." 90 Obviously, party self-
determination lies at the core of the Singapore Mediation Center's practices
as well as its presentation to consumers.
The Professional Mediators' Association (PMA) Members' Code of
Conduct and Practice Standards direct mediators "to conduct mediation
based on the principle of party self-determination and informed choice." 9 '
Mediators are required to "respect, value and encourage the ability of each
participant to make individual decisions."92 Overall, the definitions indicate a
preference for party self-determination and autonomy in decision-making.
B. The Role ofMediators
One way to ensure that party autonomy receives full expression is to
limit the scope of the mediator's role in order to reduce, as far as it is
possible, incursions on party self-determination. Each of the codes surveyed
contains requirements that the mediator conduct herself in impartial fashion,
favoring neither a particular party over the other nor any particular outcome
over another. Additionally, mediators are limited in the sort of information
they can provide and the ways that they provide it.
The Australian NMAS provides that the mediator is not to give advice,
evaluate, or determine the dispute unless utilizing a "blended process,"
which involves different forms of evaluation, is more directive, and is used
with the parties' consent. 9 Acknowledging that parties may request
information during the course of negotiations, the Standards urge mediators
to encourage parties to seek information and advice from outside
professionals. If parties do look to the mediator for "expert information," this
information may be provided if it falls within the mediator's particular
competence, is couched in general terms, and delivered in non-prescriptive
fashion. While informed consent is critical to party decision-making, the
mediator is not responsible for ensuring that parties obtain relevant
information and must not provide legal advice.
9 See SINGAPORE MEDIATION CENTRE, Mediation as a Stance,
http://www.mediation.com.sg/about-us/#mediation-as-a-stance (last visited Feb. 22,
2016).
91 MEMBERS' CODE OF CONDUCT AND PRACTICE STANDARDS AND COMMENTARY § I
(PROF'L MEDIATORS' Ass'N 2012).
9 Id.
93 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION Sys. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 2.5, (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012). See also NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE
STANDARDS §§ 2.2, 10.2 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015).
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The U.S. Model Standards mirror the Australian Standards in a number
of respects. They also emphasize that parties should make "free and
informed choices as to process and outcome" and similarly absolve
mediators from serving as the guarantor of informed consent.9 4 Like the
Australian Standards, the Model Standards suggest that when parties are in
need of information, the first line of response is to suggest recourse to
outside professionals.9 s Where the mediator chooses to provide information
to parties, she must ensure it is within her area of expertise and remember
that doing so poses risks. The Model Standards contain the warning that,
"The role of a mediator differs substantially from other professional roles.
Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of another profession"-say, for
example, that of a lawyer-"is problematic and thus, a mediator should
distinguish between the roles."9 Although little explicitly is said, the Model
Standards make clear that mediators should be wary of providing
information and must be conscious that doing so may undermine the process'
overall goals of nurturing party self-determination.97
The IMI Code is silent on the mediator's role in providing or refraining
from providing relevant information or advice. Rather, the Code addresses
only the mediator's obligation to ensure parties "have the opportunity to ...
obtain legal or other counsel before any final resolution."98 Whether or not
the parties do in fact seek counsel, the mediator must be satisfied that the
parties "knowingly consent" to any resolution reached." The Code, then,
assumes the importance of informed consent, but does not delve into the
question of how the parties are to obtain the information they will need to
make knowing and informed decisions.
The Singapore Mediation Centre's Mediation Service Code of Conduct
provides that, "The mediator will not evaluate the parties' case unless
requested by all parties to do so, and unless he is satisfied that he is able to
make such an evaluation." 00 The PMA Members' Code of Conduct prohibits
the mediator from providing "participants with legal advice, therapy,
94 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard (I)(A)(2) (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2005) ("A mediator cannot personally ensure that each party has made free
and informed choices to reach particular decisions.").
95 Id.
96 Id at Standard (VI)(A)(5).
9 Id at Standard (1)(A)(1).
98 CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 3.2.2 (INT'L MEDIATION INST.),
https:/imimediation.org/imi-code-of-professional-conduct (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
9 CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 3.2.3 (INT'L MEDIATION INST.),
https://imimediation.org/imi-code-of-professional-conduct (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
i00 MEDIATION SERV. CODE OF CONDUCT § 8.1 (SING. MEDIATION CTR. 2013).
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counselling, or other professional services during the mediation." 10
Additionally, it follows the common approach of suggesting the mediator be
an informed consent cheerleader or watchdog, while not specifying exactly
what role the mediator can or should play in the provision of necessary
information.
It is obvious that the codes we have surveyed tend to follow a similar
path. They place party autonomy at the center of the process. They state that
mediation should aim toward agreements that reflect the parties' voluntary
and informed consent, but are vague as to how the parties are to obtain the
information that would render their consent truly informed. They suggest that
mediators should urge parties to get the information they need from outside
parties. If the parties choose not to do so, the codes provide a pathway for
those mediators inclined to provide information themselves. However, the
codes offer several cautions and make clear that a mediator who provides
information does so at his or her own peril. If the mediator veers toward the
provision of information so specific it could be interpreted as advice, then
that practitioner has stepped over the line.
C. Procedural and Substantive Justice
Virtually every mediation code in existence, including the ones surveyed
here, pay obeisance to the requisites of procedural justice. Affording parties
equal time to speak and to be heard and treating parties with respect are
standard fixtures in most mediation codes and align with the common
mediation view that, if sufficient attention is paid to process, the resulting
agreement will be substantively fair. Some mediation codes, however, adopt
a somewhat paradoxical stance. They emphasize procedural justice and
caution against excessive mediator influence. Yet, almost as a backdoor
gesture, these same codes ask the mediator to be the last backstop against
errant substantive injustice. While issuing no definite injunction, they allow
the mediator to terminate the process if one party acts unconscionably or if
an unconscionable agreement appears likely. Thus, while code authors are
concerned that mediators not dominate or usurp party discussions, they
remain uncomfortable with the threat that power imbalances, or other
antecedent inequities, will turn the mediation setting into one of exploitation
and abuse.
The U.S. Model Standards and the PMA Code illustrate the "pure
procedural justice" approach where no mention is made of substantive
.0. MEMBERS' CODE OF CONDUCT AND PRACTICE STANDARDS AND COMMENTARY §5
(PROF'L MEDIATORS' Ass'N 2012).
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justice. Standard VI of the U.S. Code, which is devoted to "Quality of the
Process," directs the mediator.to conduct the process "in a manner that
promotes . . . procedural fairness," but makes no mention of fairness of the
outcome.'0 2 A mediator has the option of withdrawing if the mediation is
being used to further criminal conduct, if there is violence between the
parties, or if the mediator feels she cannot remain impartial, but there is no
option for withdrawal where the agreement appears to the mediator to be
substantively unfair.i0 3 An omnibus direction exists for the mediator to "take
appropriate steps," including possible withdrawal if the mediator believes
that participant conduct "jeopardizes conducting a mediation consistent with
these Standards," but since the Standards set no ceiling or floor with regard
to the terms of resulting agreements, it would appear that this provision
relates to procedural matters only.1 04 The PMA tracks the U.S. Standards,
except it includes an additional warning for the mediator who might be
tempted to apply external criterion to the parties' discussions, cautioning that
"the mediator must respect the culture, beliefs, rights and autonomy of the
participants and should defer their own views to those of the participants
55105
The more ambivalent aspects of the Australian, IMI, EU, and Singapore
codes are salient upon quick perusal. The Australian code, for example,
contains an entire section on procedural fairness 06 and cautions the mediator
against evaluating outcomes reached by the probable "litigated outcomes."'0 7
102 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI(A) (AM. BAR
ASS'N 2005).
103 Id at Standard VI(A), II(C).
"Id at Standard VI(C).
1os MEMBERS' CODE OF CONDUCT AND PRACTICE STANDARDS AND COMMENTARY § I
(PROF'L MEDIATORS' Ass'N 2012).
10 6 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 9 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012) ("A mediator will support the participants to reach any
agreement freely, voluntarily, without undue influence, and on the basis of informed
consent," which will ensure that parties have the opportunity to speak and be heard,
support balanced negotiation, refrain from pressuring parties to reach an agreement and
encourage parties to obtain independent professional advice). See NAT'L MEDIATOR
ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 7.4 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015)
(a similar provision in the 2015 Standards). See also NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION
SYs. PRACTICE STANDARDS §§ 7.6, 8.5 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015) (provisions
related to seeking professional advice; the 2015 standards do not contain any provision
directed at the mediator pressuring parties to reach an agreement).
107NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 9.7 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012). See NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE
STANDARDS §§ 7.7, 10.1 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015) (the 2015 standards do
not specifically outlaw consideration of probable litigated results; they provide that the
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Although it does note that a mediator should support the parties in assessing
the practicality and feasibility of any possible agreement, that assessment
must be done according to the parties' subjective understandings of
fairness. 108 One might interpret this language to mean that any societal
consensus as embodied in legal rights and entitlements are secondary to the
parties' own ideas and thus, not relevant to the process. At the same time, the
code does contain language that could .be read to the contrary. The code
states that when assessing a proposed agreement's feasibility, the interests of
"vulnerable stakeholders" should be considered. 109 An entire provision
devoted to power imbalances requires mediators be trained to spot situations
where the bargaining table is dangerously uneven and be alert to instances of
subtle threat and intimidation.110 When discussing mediator competence, the
code requires training in the ethics of assuring "fairness and equity"''' and
when discussing the mediator's limited role as information-provider, the
code suggests it is appropriate in some disputes for the mediator to turn
attention to a proposed solution's impact on absent third party
mediator must "encourage and support negotiations that focus on the participants'
respective interests, issues and underlying needs and must encourage participants to
assess any proposed agreements accordingly and with reference to their long-term
viability.").
'0 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION Sys. APPROVAL STANDARDS § 9.7
(MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2012). For a somewhat similar provision in the 2015
Standards, see NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 7.7
(MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015). Under the 2015 provisions, the mediator is to
encourage parties to make assessments based on their needs, interests, issues and
viability of any agreement.
1' NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION Sys. APPROVAL STANDARDS § 9.7
(MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2012). See NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS.
PRACTICE STANDARDS § 8.4 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015).
..oNAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION Sys. APPROVAL STANDARDS § 5 (MEDIATORS
STANDARD BOARD 2012). See NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs. PRACTICE
STANDARDS §§ 6.1, 10.1 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015) (the 2015 Standards
provide that the "mediator must be alert to changing balances of power in mediation and
manage the mediation accordingly" and must have knowledge of "the nature of conflict,
including the dynamics of power and violence" and must have the "ability to manage
high emotion, power imbalances, impasses and violence.").
i. NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 7.3(c)
(MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2012). See NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs.
PRACTICE STANDARDS § 10.1(c)(v) (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015) (the 2015
Standards differs slightly by requiring the mediator to have an understanding of the
ethical principles in relation to "procedural fairness and equity in mediation including
withdrawing from or terminating the mediation process.").
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stakeholders. 112 Most importantly, when discussing termination of the
process, the code states that the mediator may terminate when, in the
judgment of the mediator, the parties are reaching a substantively
unconscionable agreement." 3 Thus, despite the code's significant emphasis
on mediator self-restraint, it ultimately places the mediator in the role of
backstop, a final bulwark against the exploitation of the unwary by more
knowledgeable and perhaps unscrupulous bargainers.
The IMI Code of Professional Conduct is similarly mysterious regarding
the mediator's relationship to the substantive fairness of the mediation
agreement. On the one hand, the focus of the code appears initially to lie
with questions of procedural fairness. One section entitled "Fairness and
Integrity of the [P]rocess" requires the mediator to "conduct the process with
fairness to all parties."ll 4 This requirement is further explained as ensuring
the parties have an opportunity to be heard, be involved in the process, and
consult with legal counsel." However, there is no corollary requirement that
mediators attend to the terms of the agreement being discussed. However, the
Code does vest the mediator with some duties of assessment in a provision
discussing termination of the process. Like the Australian Code, the IMI
Code provides that the mediator "may withdraw from a mediation if a
negotiation among the parties assumes a character that to the mediator
appears unconscionable or illegal."ll 6 Obviously, this last provision vests the
mediator with the authority-and the burden-to determine when
112 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 10.4
(MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2012). See NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs.
PRACTICE STANDARDS § 8.4 (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015).
".3 NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 11.3
(MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2012). This provision is not included in the 2015
Standards. Circumstances under which a mediator may suspend or terminate include "if
they form the view that the mediation is no longer suitable or productive." This will
include where a participant "is unable or unwilling to participate," "is misusing the
mediation," "is not engaging in the mediation in good faith," and where the "safety of
one or more participants may be at risk." However, these are examples only and the list is
non-exhaustive. See NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYS. PRACTICE STANDARDS § 5.1
(MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015). The provision in the 2015 standards that comes
closest to speaking to outcome fairness is the one that requires the mediator to
demonstrate ethical understanding in relation to procedural fairness and equity in
mediation. This provision may be interpreted broadly to include equity in relation to the
outcome of the mediation. See NAT'L MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION SYs. PRACTICE
STANDARDS § 10.1(c)(v) (MEDIATORS STANDARD BOARD 2015).
114 CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 3.2.2 (INT'L MEDIATION INST.),
https://imimediation.org/imi-code-of-professional-conduct (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
115 Id
116 Id
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suspension, termination, or withdrawal is necessary based on an evaluation
of the possible outcome as substantively unfair or inequitable.
The EU Code of Conduct for Mediators appears designed to sensitize
mediators to the threat of substantive unfairness, but provides little guidance
regarding the mediator's role in preventing it. It notes helpfully that
mediators should conduct the process "appropriately," keeping in mind the
possible existence of power imbalances and the rule of law as well as the
parties' possible desire to end the dispute quickly without affording
themselves of all the protections that an adversary procedure might allow."'
"Process fairness" in this code means that each party will have an
opportunity to speak and the mediator may terminate the discussions if the
agreement reached appears illegal or unenforceable." 8 It is notable that the
last provision relating to termination places the mediator in the position of
evaluating the outcome-fairness of the agreement reached, a position of
critique or judgment that the remainder of the code provisions explicitly
warns against. The Singapore Mediation Centre's Code of Conduct similarly
does not explicitly hold the mediator responsible for the substantive fairness
of any agreement reached. But, it does allow the mediator to terminate the
mediation if "any of the parties acts unconscionably," thus suggesting that a
mediator who brings her own assessments of what constitutes
unconscionable behavior into the parties' dispute is nonetheless acting
appropriately and within the bounds of ethical mediator behavior." 9
The codes we have surveyed reflect the vast majority of mediation ethics
standards; they require mediators attend diligently to the requisites of
procedural justice, but make few or no references to the substantive justice of
the resulting agreement. Codes that do address the fairness of the mediation
outcome do so in the context of terminating the mediation agreement. Some
codes require the mediator to terminate the process if the resulting agreement
is illegal, unfair, or unconscionable. Others simply raise termination as an
option that remains at the mediator's discretion. These termination
provisions suggest that the mediator can, and in some instances should,
subject the proposed agreement to an assessment based on criteria that differ
from the parties' own preferences.
117 EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § 3.2,
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr-ec-code-conduct-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,
2016).
118 Id.
119 MEDIATION SERV. CODE OF CONDUCT § 6.2(b) (SING. MEDIATION CTR. 2013),
http://www.intracen.org/Code-of-Conduct-Singapore-Mediation-
Centre/#sthash.OblXhS58.dpuf.
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We applaud these provisions. We think that they represent a positive
development in the evolution of mediation's ethical canon. Nevertheless, the
provisions also reveal a central tension within the codes. If a mediator's only
ethical responsibility is to respect party autonomy and remain impartial, then,
arguably, the mediator should not be assessing the fairness, legality, or
unconscionability of the parties' proposed agreement. What these
termination provisions acknowledge is that sometimes mediation
negotiations can lead to harmful or exploitative outcomes and that the
mediator should be on the lookout for these disturbing outcomes, work to
modify them, or seek to disassociate from them. Not every code contains
these termination agreements, but those that do suggest a more layered and
complex set of responsibilities for the mediator than do codes that focus
exclusively on procedural fairness to the exclusion of other concerns.
Although self-determination or party autonomy is a fundamental value of
facilitative mediation, the codes, to cater for circumstances that may lead to
unjust outcomes, are shifting from complete reification of self-determination
to an acknowledgement that the mediator may have a role to play in
protecting against gross exploitation or unfairness. The critiques that have
dogged mediation from its earliest days acknowledge the threat that power
imbalances and systematic inequities pose to a quality process. That
literature of critique confronts directly what some mediation ethics codes
hint at covertly-that the mediator has a role to play in ensuring that
mediation agreements meet some sort of minimal threshold of justice-both
for each party and for affected parties outside the mediation room. In our
view, existing codes should formally recognize that self-determination and
party autonomy are crucial, but not the single ethical basis for mediator's
conduct.
Thus far, we have argued that the question of mediator accountability for
ensuring minimal levels of substantive fairness has been the subject of
inconclusive debate in the mediation literature. We have further argued that
existing mediation codes either ignore the question of substantive justice
altogether or speak to questions of justice with a divided tongue. In the next
section, we argue that shifting from a purely Kantian to a Rawisian view of
justice helps clarify and support our argument that substantive justice can
and should become part of the mediation ethics canon.
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V. A RAWLSIAN APPROACH TO MEDIATION ETHICS
John Rawls, arguably the most important political philosopher of the
twentieth century, was a social contract theorist who sought to develop a
theory of justice that functioned as an alternative to utilitarianism. 120
Utilitarians, as Rawls explained, define right action as that which creates the
greatest happiness for the greatest number. Morality becomes a question of
maximizing happiness, while the dilemma of happiness distribution is put
aside.121 One man of ten may be enslaved to tend to the needs of the other
nine and the action would be "right" so long as the happiness of the nine free
men exceeds the unhappiness of the one slave.
Rawls rejected this account and instead proposed a vision of right action
that moves questions of distributional equity front and center. Rawls' theory
is crucially concerned with the appropriate division of social advantages and
is devised to answer the question: [H]ow do we arrive at a just allocation of
social goods in the face of competing claims? Rawls suggests that the answer
can be arrived at procedurally by devising a social contract that members
enter into while situated in what Rawls terms "the original position"
operating behind the "veil of ignorance."l 22
The original position, it must be understood, is not an actual status or
ranking in society. It is instead a "purely hypothetical situation characterized
so as to lead to a certain conception of justice." 23 Operating behind a veil of
ignorance, individuals in this position have no idea what status they occupy
in society. They are ignorant of their social class, gender, and educational
level. They do not know if they are born into affluence or poverty, if their
dad is a janitor or hedge fund partner, if they are handsome or homely, able-
bodied or disabled.1 2 4 Indeed, in the original position, people are unaware of
their strengths and weakness. They are unaware of "[their] conception 'of the
good . . . the special features of [their] psychology such as . . . aversion to
risk or liability to optimism or pessimism." 125 The parties, however, are
aware of "the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies." 26 These
circumstances are those in which a moderate scarcity of resources exists
warranting redistribution to everyone's advantage.1 2 7
120 RAWLS, supra note 76, at 22.
121 Id at 26.
122Id
123 Id at 12.
124 Id at 12, 137.
125 Id. at 137.
126Id
127 Id
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Rawls assumes that the individuals placed behind the veil of ignorance
are rational, self-interested decision makers. That is, all things being equal,
Rawis' decision-makers "would prefer more primary social goods rather than
less. [They would] . . . seek to protect their liberties, widen their
opportunities ... and enlarge their means for promoting their aims, whatever
they are."l 28 However, standing in the original position with no knowledge of
where they are situated in the social hierarchy, these individuals have every
incentive to devise rules of engagement that are mutually beneficial to all
ages, genders, socioeconomic classes, cultures, and ethnicities since it is
unclear to which community, class, or affiliation they will belong. Working
with this construct, Rawls hypothesized that decision-makers would
cooperatively embrace the "difference principle," a distributive principle that
"social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are .. . to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged."' 29
It is important to recognize that Rawls was bent on pursuing an object
quite different from the construction of ethical standards in mediation. Rawls
was interested in defending a theory of social governance and devising
methods for the distribution of social advantages under conditions of
moderate scarcity. He was concerned with societal institutions writ large, not
with how individuals work out their disputes in private settings. Nonetheless,
to the degree that Rawls sought to identify a method that would yield a just
ordering of social institutions, his ideas can be usefully transposed to the
project of identifying which set of ethical mandates will yield just outcomes
in mediation.
Let us place a mediation party in the original position for a moment and
wrap her in the veil of ignorance. She does not know her status in society.
She does not know the nature of her dispute. She does not know whether she
has the money or practical understanding to hire a legal representative. She
does not know whether she is articulate or nearly mute, assertive or shy, in
perfect mental health or suffering from trauma. She does not know with
whom she is disputing, whether it is another individual or a large
corporation. She does not know the extent of the resources the other party
brings to bear on the mediation and she does not know whether the other side
128 Id at 142-43.
129 Id at 266 ("Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just
savings principle, and
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.").
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is telling the truth, operating in good faith, or using the mediation process for
unscrupulous ends.
While secluded from any information about her personal circumstances
that might bias her answer, we then ask the following: What sort of ethical
responsibility do you think your mediator should assume when considering
questions of justice? You have choices. You could limit your mediator's
responsibilities to matters of procedure. That would mean that the mediator
would have a responsibility for ensuring that you and your representatives
have many opportunities to speak and be heard. Additionally, the mediator
would have the responsibility to conduct the mediation with impartiality,
favoring neither you nor your adversary and treating each of you with
consideration and respect. If the mediator felt that you did not understand the
goals and methods of the mediation process or the issues under discussion,
she would be required to halt or terminate the discussion. In a purely
procedural conception of justice, this would be the extent of the mediator's
responsibilities.
Alternatively, you could impose upon the mediator an additional
obligation. You could include within the mediator's ethical code an
obligation to attend to the substantive fairness of the resulting agreement.
You could make this requirement as stringent or as elastic as you like. You
could specify simply that the mediation agreement should avoid terms that
could be characterized as unconscionable, exploitative, or abusive to one or
more parties. Alternatively, you could prohibit the mediator from assessing
the substantive fairness of the mediation agreement in any way and include
this prohibition in ethical codes of conduct. Your choice.
What choice would you make if you did not know what internal
capabilities or external resources you could bring to the mediation process?
What choice would you make if you thought it possible that you might be the
weakest party in the room? Would you be confident that the procedural
protections embedded in most mediation ethics codes would be sufficient to
protect your interests or would you want the mediator to be sensitized to the
possibilities of substantive justice and ethically authorized to raise
substantive justice concerns if the circumstances warrant?
One can be certain that parties in the original position would be
influenced by their circumstances to choose principles that will lead to
everyone's advantage since each party would be ignorant about "his place in
society, his class, position or social status . . . his fortune in the distribution
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength."iso The parties
would choose principles that will benefit the vulnerable. The parties would
130Id. at 137.
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consider that if they happened to be affluent, powerful parties, they would be
in a position to obtain the best outcome from the process and any alternative
processes. If, on the other hand, they turned out to be the vulnerable, they
would hope for some assistance from the mediator and would urge the
adoption of ethical codes that allow mediators latitude to intervene to prevent
unjust outcomes.
Knowing that legal rights are safeguards for ensuring justice, parties in
the original position would want to ensure those safeguards are promoted in
mediation processes. This way, parties can be assured they would not be
denied important legal rights in mediation.
It is our view that the more disadvantaged party would likely prefer to
participate in a process where the mediator is charged with ensuring not
simply fair procedures, but some basic minimal standard of substantive
fairness. We believe that this charge would provide assurance to parties who
feel unconfident, either in their own negotiation capacities or in the
competence of counsel, if they are fortunate enough to be able to access
representation. In taking this position, we are well aware of the
counterarguments likely to be advanced by "pure proceduralists." We
address these in turn.
A. How can a mediator assess substantive justice when justice has no
enduring content and represents mere subjective preferences?
The first likely response, emanating from the postmodernist camp, would
be that expecting a mediator to assess substantive justice is incoherent
because no absolute, stable notion of justice exists. Concepts of justice
simply reflect subjective preference, and there is no justification for
imposing a mediator's subjective preference on the parties.
We have two responses to that objection. First, we acknowledge that
concepts of what constitutes just treatment can vary with the individual.
However, at more general levels, we believe that it is not difficult to gain
consensus as to what constitutes an agreement so unbalanced that it should
not be concluded under mediation's auspices. For example, although
reasonable people might disagree regarding the exact proper division of a
working spouse's pension at the termination of a long-term marriage, most
would agree that a division that would leave either spouse in penury for the
duration of their old age would be unconscionable. Similarly, twenty lawyers
might each develop twenty different proposals for what a just conclusion to a
landlord-tenant dispute might involve, but likely, all twenty of them would
agree that a resolution that requires a tenant to continue paying rent
throughout the winter for an apartment that has no heat or hot water is unjust.
The point is that we are not charging the mediator with the task of
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identifying the one permissible just resolution and trying to sell that to the
parties. That would be problematic on any number of levels. Rather, we are
proposing that the mediator remain alert to those few situations where a
power imbalance in the mediation has led to a truly shocking and
insupportable result. Acknowledging that cultural, political, and ideological
commitments complicate efforts to identify content-full notions of justice to
which we all subscribe, we are setting the bar for the mediator exceedingly
low. We suggest the mediator disassociate herself from-and seek to
dissuade the parties from binding themselves to-agreements that are
unconscionable, that is, agreements that are so one-sided and unfair that they
shock the conscience. By doing so, we believe the postmodern critique of
justice's indeterminacy loses much of its power.
B. How can a mediator assess substantive justice when they lack the
necessary expertise to do so?
This objection differs from the previous one. It assumes that there may
be standards of justice to which we all might subscribe but posits that the
mediator is ill-situated to determine how that standard should be applied in
the dispute at hand. The mediator, it is argued, is ill-suited for two reasons.
First, the mediator has no particular access to the standards as embodied in
legal norms, governmental ruling, or the teachings of particular disciplines,
such as engineering, psychology, or otherwise. The mediator is a process
expert, not a subject matter expert. If the case involves intellectual property,
child psychology, collective bargaining agreements, bridge engineering, or
landlord-tenant law, the mediator is likely a generalist and not equipped to
determine which rule, law, principle, or contractual provision should govern.
Second, the mediator has insufficient access to the facts of the dispute such
that she could make a reliable determination as to how the relevant standards
apply in the parties' particular context. After all, many mediators receive no
pre-mediation submissions, so all they know about the dispute is what the
parties or their representatives reveal during the initial opening statement.
There is nothing to prevent parties from selectively omitting unhelpful facts,
and there is ample anecdotal evidence that parties do precisely that.
So what will be required of the mediator who is concerned about
substantive justice? To answer this question, it is important to consider what
this mediator is not being asked to do. The mediator is not being asked to
wear a lawyer or a judge's hat; she is not expected to be knowledgeable
about every discipline, trade, or subject matter. She is not being asked to
steer parties to a particular outcome. Our argument assumes the desirability
of leaving to the parties the choice of the precise terms and conditions of
settlement. What we are asking is that the mediator be prepared to serve as
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the last backstop against unfairness. What this means is that when the parties
are moving toward a truly shocking outcome (which should be apparent to
even the mediator who is neither an expert on the facts or law relating to the
dispute), the mediator is prepared to raise with both the empowered and
disempowered parties her concern with the possible negative effects that
such an agreement might generate. In other words, where a conflict might
resolve in one hundred possible ways, and ten of those possibilities would be
unfair and exploitative for one of the parties, we would argue that the
mediator should bring this to the attention of the parties. The mediator need
not be an expert in either the law or the facts to identify the small percentage
of options that fall beyond the pale.
C. How can a mediator, bound by the profession's codes and best
practices to be impartial, have any obligations for outcome
fairness?
A mediator who withholds her imprimatur from unconscionable
arrangements will either be pushing the parties to consider less unbalanced
terms or withdrawing in the face of seriously inequitable agreements. Either
way, the mediator will be benefitting the party who would otherwise be
binding herself to an agreement seriously skewed against her and
withdrawing a benefit from the party who would gain from the imbalance.
Won't this behaviour violate the mediator's duty of impartiality?
We think the only honest answer to this response is, "Yes." Advocating
against extremely one-sided agreements or those that pose serious risks to
absent third parties does require the mediator to stray from a stance of formal
impartiality.' ' If impartiality entails the absence of bias or partiality, not
1' See Susan Nauss Exon, How Can a Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair: Why
Ethical Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 387
(2006) (arguing that mediators' ethical responsibilities sometimes conflict and that the
Standards do not adequately address this issue); Michael T. Collatrella, Informed Consent
in Mediation: Promoting Pro Se Parties' Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring
the Mediator's Ethical Duties, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 705 (2014) (arguing
that mediators cannot maintain impartiality if they are required to ensure informed
outcome consent). But see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation:
A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decision-making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775
(1999) (arguing that the doctrine of informed consent in mediation ought to be more
concretized in order to ensure fairness); Hilary Astor, Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense
of Theory and Practice, 16(2) Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 221 (2007) (arguing that there is
need for a new approach to neutrality in mediation-which makes sense in practice and
in theory-suggesting a method of practice that requires (rather than outlaws) attention to
power relationships); Susan Douglas, Constructions of Neutrality in Mediation, 23(2)
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only with regard to the parties but with regard to outcomes,1 32 then resisting
unconscionable outcomes obviously compromises this stance. This is the
cost of asking the mediator to guard against unjust outcomes.' We think,
though, that if the mediator approaches this task with humility,
conscientiousness, and discretion, that the cost will be a small one.
Those who object to tasking the mediator with responsibility for minimal
levels of outcome fairness imagine a highly interventionist mediator
aggressively inserting him or herself into the parties' negotiations to shape an
outcome that corresponds with his or her own unique vision of justice. But,
mediators can work to avoid grossly unfair outcomes without unduly
intruding on the parties' own negotiations. The mediator we imagine strives
toward a noninterventionist stance and only inserts herself as a "fairness
cheerleader" as a last resort when the bargaining process seems seriously
askew. Even in that circumstance, the mediator will be sensitive to the
possibility that the parties' idiosyncratic needs and interests may be
influencing the decision to deviate from an agreement that more closely
tracks expected legal outcomes. After discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of approaches that more traditionally incorporate social or
legal norms with parties, the mediator will, in the great majority of
circumstances, concur with the parties' choices. It is only when the mediator
suspects that one party has not adequately considered the long-term effect of
the agreement on his or her best interests, or the outcome poses serious risks
to absent stakeholders, that our mediator will continue as a dissenting voice
and consider withdrawing from the mediation.
AUSTRALASIAN DIsP. RESOL. J. 80-88 (2012) (discussing the Australian National
Mediation Accreditation Scheme provisions in relation to neutrality and noting the
tension between the requirement of impartiality and promoting fairness).
132 It is important to note, however, that asking the mediator to resist unjust
outcomes in no way compromises the mediator's obligation to maintain an impartial
stance vis-A-vis the parties. The Model Standards forbid the mediator from acting "with
partiality or prejudice based on any participant's personal characteristics, background,
values and beliefs, or performance at a mediation . . . ." MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
FOR MEDIATORS Standard (ll)(B)(1) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2005) (a mediator may follow this
injunction, while at the same time refusing the endorse outcomes that fall below a
minimal fairness standard); RACHAEL FIELD, EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF CONTEXTUAL
ETHICS IN MEDIATION (2008), reprinted in ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS
AND LEGAL ETHICS: REIMAGING THE PROFESSION 197 (Francesca Bartlett et al. eds.,
2011) (exploring the potential of contextual ethics in mediation).
133 See Shapira, supra note 6, at 28.
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D. Ifyour Rawlsian mediator is not telling the parties what is fair and
what to do, how does your mediator differ from standard
conceptions of the mediator role that task the mediator with
responsibility for process fairness alone?
Perhaps the real difference between the functions of the Rawlsian
mediator and standard conceptions is that the Rawlsian mediator functions
more deliberately as a consciousness-raiser and a safety net. The Rawlsian
mediator would begin her entry into the process consciously raising the
parties' awareness about the importance of substantive justice in the
mediation process. This discussion would begin in pre-mediation sessions.
The mediator would emphasize that ensuring procedural justice falls squarely
within the mediator's expertise and charge but that identifying what is
substantively fair will require the parties to think deeply about their own
values and that it is their responsibility to take steps to achieve fairness
during negotiations. The Rawlsian mediator will reiterate the standard
mediation script that the mediator is not responsible for determining who is
right or wrong, who behaved well or badly, or how things should be made
right. The mediator will point out, however, that the mediation process does
strive toward just outcomes and that the parties will be called upon to
formulate standards by which they, as individuals, would assess fairness. The
standards may include legal, trade, professional, or individually devised
criteria, whatever meets the parties' understandings of what justice in their
own situation requires. Where a party lacks the capacity or resources to
formulate justice standards, the mediator will encourage them to seek legal
advice or the support of a third party. And, if both parties seek to use the
mediator as an informational resource and the mediator is qualified to serve
in this role, then the mediator may be the source of information that helps the
parties elaborate upon their own intuitions of what justice requires in their
own situation. With the mediator's help, the parties can generate fully
fleshed out justice criteria that can then be applied to the options that each
party has proposed for settlement. In sum, the mediator works to raise the
parties' consciousness about the goals of the process in terms of the
outcomes reached and encourages the parties to think deeply about the
justice criteria they choose to employ.
The mediator's role as a safety net occurs toward the end of the process
as the parties are narrowing in on the particular terms of agreement. The
Rawlsian mediator has the responsibility for assuring that a proposed
outcome or option is not so one-sided or disadvantageous to one party or
absent third parties that it "shocks the conscience." The assessment of what
is conscience shocking will be based both on the criteria the parties have
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articulated as well as external societal standards that the mediator, if
requested, will have shared with the parties.
VI. APPLICATION: AN ACTUAL CASE FOR THE RAWLSIAN MEDIATOR
Let us concretize the approach we imagine a Rawlsian mediator would
take in a hypothetical case, the Tongan Slip and Fall.
You are mediating a slip-and-fall personal injury case. The plaintiff,
a newly arrived immigrant from Tonga, was injured when he stopped
into the defendant's convenience store to use the facilities on the
way to a job interview. The defendant's cleaning crew had mopped
the restroom area in the back of the store, but neglected to post a sign
alerting shoppers that the floor was wet. The plaintiff suffered
serious injuries, including permanent nerve damage, in the fall and
has incurred significant medical debt because he has no health
insurance. Defendant is arguing that the plaintiff was not a customer,
and thus, they owed no duty to him to maintain the restroom in a dry,
safe condition. The plaintiff speaks little English and cannot follow
the proceedings. His attorney, a fellow Tongan who has been
practicing law in the United States for only four months, appears to
misunderstand the relevant legal doctrines on landowner liability that
supply his client with compelling arguments for recovery. Because
the plaintiff has no job and is concerned about paying some portion
of his debt to the health care providers who serviced him, he is
preparing to settle with the defendant store owner for 10 percent of
what you believe to be a $200,000 claim.' 3 4
What would the Rawlsian mediator do?
The Rawlsian mediator would first note that there are several features of
this mediation that suggest that a power imbalance exists between the
plaintiff and the defendant and that the negotiation could very well lead to an
agreement that "shocks the conscience" and does not serve the injured
Tongan well in the long run. The Tongan plaintiff is vulnerable because he
does not understand English well, does not know his entitlements under the
law, and is represented by a lawyer who is also uninformed about the law
applicable to his client's case. These facts have contributed to the willingness
of the injured Tongan and his lawyer to accept a settlement figure, which
" WALDMAN, supra note 67, at 135.
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falls far short of what a court of law might award. Procedurally, our plaintiff
lacks sufficient information to reach an informed decision about his options
and this procedural defect threatens to lead to an unjust outcome.
The mediator following a code developed from the original position will
take some responsibility for ensuring substantive justice. This would mean
that the mediator, from the onset, would have alerted parties to the
importance of substantive justice and explained that this is primarily the
responsibility of the parties, with the mediator serving as a "backstop" or
safety net. The mediator would explain that the parties should make use of
the opportunity provided in the process to deliberate over and discuss what
they would consider a fair outcome and by what standards they would
measure fairness. At the same time, the mediator would work to level the
unequal playing field between the defendant landlord and the Tongan
plaintiff and his lawyer by ensuring that the language gap is closed,
endeavouring to ensure the plaintiff gains a fuller understanding of the legal
rights he is waiving, and, if necessary, intervening if a party is about to agree
to terms that fall far short of what is acceptable by societal standards.
The Rawlsian mediator will need to engage in a number of interventions
designed to ensure that the Tongan plaintiff is informed about the array of
options available to him. At a minimum, the plaintiff needs to understand the
likelihood of obtaining a more substantial recovery in court and the barriers
and hurdles that might impede such recovery. The mediator must be prepared
to adjourn the process for the plaintiff to seek legal advice or assistance of a
trusted family member or friend. The mediator must be prepared to intervene
to ensure that the injured Tongan and his lawyer have fully assessed the risks
and benefits of settlement versus the risks and possible benefits of continuing
to litigate the claim. This would include asking the injured Tongan about the
legal advice he has received and the lawyer about his awareness of the law in
the area including the likely court outcome. The Rawlsian mediator will not
advise the plaintiff either to settle, or demand more money, or exit the
mediation and hire another lawyer. However, the Rawlsian mediator must, at
a minimum, ensure that the plaintiff has thought about what for him
constitutes a sufficiently adequate settlement, such that it is worth forgoing
the possible gains that future disputing might bring. Asking questions, such
as, "If you were confident that a judge would award more money to you in
court, would you ask for more money here in mediation?" Or, "What sort of
investigation of landowner responsibilities have you done prior to this
mediation?" Or, "Do you think $20,000 is going to be enough for you to pay
your medical bills and get back on your feet after this injury?" These are all
ways of pushing the plaintiff (and his lawyer) to think about what would be a
substantively fair outcome and what role legal norms plays in that
assessment.
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If, at the end of that intervention, the injured Tongan and his lawyer are
still prepared to accept ten percent of a possible court outcome, the mediator
would have to consider whether it would be appropriate to terminate or
withdraw from the mediation on that basis. In our opinion, unless factors that
render the process defective are present, the outcome is not so unfavorable
that the mediation should feel duty-bound to withdraw. However, the
mediator would have demonstrated her concern for the justness of the
outcome and would have raised the consciousness of the parties as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explored the relevance of Rawls' theory of justice
to mediation ethics, arguing that, given the rise of inequality in most parts of
the world and the ascendancy of mediation as a popular and frequently
adopted dispute resolution process, Rawls' theory of justice could form the
basis of a revitalized mediation ethics. Mediation's relationship to social
justice is both muddled and fraught. A rich body of literature critiques
mediation as a regressive process impeding disadvantaged groups' access to
justice, while mediation defenders reject rights-based notions of fairness and
focus on the value of voice and autonomy in the disputing process. Ethics
codes reflect this muddle, emphasizing both the importance of party self-
determination and mediator impartiality, while, in some instances, suggesting
that grossly one-sided agreements might require mediator intervention or
withdrawal.
We have argued that importing Rawls' theory ofjustice into the canon of
mediation ethics creates space for standards of conduct that honor party
autonomy while taking seriously the obligation to care for and nurture
substantive fairness in mediation outcomes. To flush out what such a code
might look like, we borrowed Rawls' proposed method by which a fair social
contract might be structured and adopted it to the mediation context. We
placed a mediation party in the original position behind a veil of ignorance
and asked: What sort of ethical responsibility do you think your mediator
should assume when considering questions of justice? In our view, the
ethical responsibilities would be those that lead to everyone's advantage by
requiring the mediator to serve as a fairness cheerleader and safety net for
parties about to agree to unconscionable terms.
We discussed a hypothetical situation based on Rawls' justice theory and
addressed four anticipated criticisms. We clarified that while our intention is
not to make mediators truth-finders, mediators should take some
responsibility for identifying unconscionable terms in settlement agreements.
Additionally, we noted that mediators need not be subject matter experts in
all of the arenas in which they mediate but should be sufficiently familiar
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with the topics in dispute to be able to spot potentially problematic
settlement provisions; we suggested that mediators facilitate a discussion
between the parties as to the social or legal norms by which they would want
to assess the justice quality of generated options and serve as a safety net for
a party about to sign off on an unfair agreement.
Rawls, as he elaborated upon the social contract that he thought would
bring about a brave, more equitably constructed world, noted, "The natural
distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born
into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What
is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts."'35
People come into mediation in different positions. Some are rich, others
poor. Some are educated, others not. Some have access to diligent, skilled
legal assistance; others do not. These are the facts that mediators face. And,
while mediators are not called into disputes to reshape the existing power
topography-nor would they likely be invited back if they did-mediation,
as an institution, must deal with the "natural distribution" of party resources
in a just fashion. The impartial mediator must be granted some latitude to
serve as fairness cheerleader and safety net when mediation outcomes veer
toward the unconscionable. This paper is a beginning effort, using Rawls'
theories as the launching pad to nudge our thinking about ethics in a
direction that takes better account of the vast levels of inequality that
permeate our modem day world-and the many disputes that roil it.
135 RAWLS, supra note 76, at 102.
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